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ABSTRACT
The Campaign to End U.S. War-Making in Yemen:
Strategies of Congressional Advocacy, 2015–2020
by
Zachary Laub
Advisor: Susan L. Woodward
Civil society groups and a handful of lawmakers have pursued a robust campaign to end U.S.
support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen in Congress. By framing the conflict as a war of Saudi
aggression and pulling legislative levers that enabled them to force floor votes, advocates turned a
niche issue into one that galvanized majorities in Congress and generated significant media coverage.
Even when vetoes blocked their ability to enact binding war powers and arms transfer legislation,
advocates nevertheless exerted political pressure that gave the president and the Saudi-led coalition
alike impetus to moderate the war effort. This case suggests both the potential and limits of pursuing
antiwar advocacy through Congress.
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I. Introduction
In March 2015, President Barack Obama took the United States into war in Yemen without
public debate, much less congressional authorization: the White House announced the matter quietly
in a press release.1 The administration insisted that it was not engaging in combat, but there is little
doubt that the United States was intimately involved in the Saudi-led war: among other things, it
provided Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners with targeting assistance and other intelligence,
refueled jets as they were making bombing runs, and the precision-guided missiles they dropped.2
Saudi Arabia had promised that the intervention would be brief, but air power failed to
dislodge Houthi insurgents and their allies, who had taken the capital, Sanaa, and were approaching
the port city of Aden. It did, however, drastically ratchet up the civil war’s destructiveness. The
coalition’s wanton disregard for civilian lives and infrastructure quickly became apparent: The
coalition declared the entire northern city of Saada a military target in the war’s early months,
destroying residences and markets.3 Intense bombardment resulted in at least 1,750 direct civilian
casualties by the end of the intervention’s first year; as the UN would document, deaths from
coalition air strikes exceeded those from ground fighting among Yemeni factions. At least as
consequential was the destruction of infrastructure vital to supplying Yemenis with food and fuel. 4

The White House, “Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen,” March 25, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehansituation-yemen.
1

See, e.g., Micah Zenko, “Make No Mistake — the United States Is at War in Yemen,” Foreign Policy, March 30, 2015,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/make-no-mistake-the-united-states-is-at-war-in-yemen-saudi-arabia-iran/.
2

Human Rights Watch, Targeting Saada: Unlawful Coalition Airstrikes on Saada City in Yemen, June 30, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/30/targeting-saada/unlawful-coalition-airstrikes-saada-city-yemen
3

UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014,
A/HRC/39/43, Annex 4 (August 17, 2018), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/252/79/PDF/G1825279.pdf?OpenElement.
4
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Amid the earliest reports of impending catastrophe, a small coterie of advocates from civil
society and on Capitol Hill coalesced to challenge U.S. support.5 Civil society groups played a variety
of roles, both working within formal institutional channels and bringing pressure to bear from
outside. They educated members of Congress and the media about the war and its humanitarian
consequences; they advised sympathetic members of Congress on laws and legislative tools at their
disposal to challenge U.S. participation in it; and they organized grassroots activists to raise the
salience of the issue with fence-straddling members of Congress through calls and town hall
appearances and demonstrations. Many of the groups were long-standing antiwar organizers or
faith-based lobbies, such as the Quaker-affiliated Friends Committee on National Legislation; others
were newer, digitally oriented networks, such as Win Without War. They forged connections with
Yemeni civil society. Most notable among them, the human rights group Mwatana provided vital
research to the media and to Congress.6
Within Congress, a handful of offices championed the issue and gave these civil society
groups institutional access.7 Progressives advocated for a more humane foreign policy, while
libertarian-leaning conservatives asserted that unauthorized war-making represented an imperial

On advocacy coalitions, see Jonathan Pierce and Katherine Hicks, “Advocacy Coalitions in Foreign Policy,” in The
Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Cameron G. Thies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). On the
related concept of issue clusters, see Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make
Foreign Policy. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 47–50.
5

See, e.g., Danny Postel, “Progressive Surge Propels Turning Point in US Policy on Yemen,” MERIP 289 (Winter 2018),
https://merip.org/2019/03/progressive-surge-propels-turning-point-in-us-policy-on-yemen/.
6

Hersman observes that individual members and their staffs routinely exercise outsize influence on foreign policy
matters of personal interest. These “issue leaders” are often influential not because of their seniority or committee
memberships but simply because they have sought-after expertise. Hersman, Friends and Foes, 29–32. Carter and Scott
term these members “foreign policy entrepreneurs,” emphasizing their ability to influence policy, through channels both
formal and informal, due to both their expertise and their persistence in building legislative coalitions. Ralph G. Carter
and James M. Scott, Choosing to Lead Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2009). One of the conditions that has enabled individual members to freelance on foreign policy issues is the
decline in activity of the foreign affairs oversight committees, which Fowler dates to the end of the Cold War. Since
then, she argues, membership on these committees has become less prestigious and politically advantageous for most
members. Linda L. Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight of U.S. Foreign Relations (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017), ch. 3. See also Hersman, Friends and Foes, 14–18.
7
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president trampling on the legislature’s constitutional prerogatives — namely, the sole right to
declare war. These members came to the issue from diverse backgrounds: Representative Ted Lieu,
for example, had been a judge advocate general in the air force; Representative. Ro Khanna cites his
family’s experience of the West Bengal famine; and the late Representative Walter Jones came to
regret the wreckage of the Iraq War and became an outspoken opponent of U.S. militarism.8 They
challenged a foreign policy mainstream prevalent in both parties that saw Saudi Arabia and its
primary coalition partner, the United Arab Emirates, as guarantors of U.S. interests in the Middle
East.
This coalition of civil society groups and their allies on Capitol Hill managed to transform
the intervention in Yemen from a niche issue to one that demanded the full Congress’s attention.
The arc of advocacy shows a build-up from mild oversight — a handful of members sending letters
querying the administration about its policy and issuing statements of concern — to majorities of
the House and Senate supporting legislative measures with teeth.
When Trump succeeded Obama, he dispensed with any U.S. ambivalence about the
worthiness of the Saudi intervention, as well as with his predecessor’s half-measures to rein in the
Gulf states’ worst abuses. As circumstances deteriorated in Yemen and evidence of atrocities
mounted, the campaign reached its zenith. By late 2018 and continuing into 2019, bipartisan
majorities coalesced around major legislation on arms sales and war powers. The two chambers
jointly voted to compel an end to U.S. participation in hostilities for the first time since the War
Powers Resolution of 1973 made possible such a measure. And a trio of joint resolutions sought to

John Nichols, “It Took Losing an Election to Really Crystalize Ro Khanna’s Vision,” The Nation, June 25, 2019,
https://www.thenation.com/podcast/politics/ro-khanna-next-left/; George Zornick, Why Is the United States Risking
Involvement in Possible War Crimes? This Congressman Wants to Know,” The Nation, November 4, 2016,
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-is-the-united-states-risking-involvement-in-possible-war-crimes-thiscongressman-wants-to-know/; and Barry Yeoman, “Walter Jones Jr. Is a Voice of Dissent in the GOP,” The Nation,
March 9, 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/walter-jones-jr-is-a-voice-of-dissent-in-the-gop/.
8
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block arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Congress had not passed such a
measure concerning arms sales to any country since 1989.9
Trump vetoed these bills, and Congress failed to muster the supermajorities necessary to
override. As a matter of lawmaking, then, the advocacy coalition would seem to have relatively
meager results for all the efforts it had invested in working through Congress. And yet advocates can
reasonably claim that the intense activity they fomented on Capitol Hill mitigated the war’s
humanitarian toll and lessened U.S. complicity in potential warm crimes. The Trump administration
reversed course, pressing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to pursue a UN-mediated
truce, when congressional momentum was at its most intense. The Gulf monarchies, savvy
participants in Washington politics, were no less aware of the tenor on Capitol Hill, and they too
moderated their conduct of the war under congressional pressure. The UAE went so far as to back
out of the coalition. A long stalemate gave both countries strategic reason to seek to wind down the
war, but contemporaneous reporting corroborates that a desire to head off congressional ire was
part of their calculus.
It was hardly inevitable that Congress would take up the war in Yemen in a forceful manner.
It has delegated significant national security authorities to the executive branch and is often
deferential to the president on matters involving the use of force. Its oversight is intermittent and
sometimes perfunctory.10 The war in Yemen, moreover, did not entail the conditions that would
make robust congressional involvement most likely. There was never a question, for example, that

Congressional Research Service, Fact Sheet: Joint Resolutions of Disapproval Under the Arms Export Control Act, May 6, 2022,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R47094.pdf. The measure ultimately failed to overcome a veto.
9

See, e.g., Linda L. Fowler, “Congressional War Powers,” in The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
10
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the U.S. military would be bogged down in a quagmire and U.S. servicemembers exposed to mortal
risk, as in Vietnam.11
Nor do the dynamics of partisanship satisfyingly explain why Congress challenged successive
presidents on this issue.12 The majorities that coalesced against the war were predominantly
Democratic, they did so only well into Trump’s term, when the Democratic base was eager for
“resistance” to a host of Trump policies cast as cruel. But not only did some stalwart Republicans
cross the aisle to champion this issue; much of this legislative bloc has stuck together well into
President Biden’s term. More than 100 House Democrats are cosponsoring a new war powers
resolution on Yemen, undoubtedly to the administration’s irritation. They include not just members
of the Progressive Caucus but also party leaders and self-styled national security pragmatists who are
otherwise closely aligned with Biden.13
The question, then, is how did advocates enlist Congress to influence the course of the
Saudi-led intervention in Yemen? The answer should be of interest to both scholars and advocates.
Observers of Congress have long noted that the body influences policy not only through
formal lawmaking and oversight functions but also in indirect ways. When an administration is

11 William

G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007), 13–14.
Howell and Pevehouse, for example, offer this hypothesis regarding the composition of Congress: “As his party’s
numbers grow, the president ought to enjoy greater discretion to exercise military force when and as he pleases; as they
dwindle the president should proceed with considerably more caution. Howell and Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather, 36.
Kriner corroborates this hypothesis and extends it from the initiation of war to its conduct. Douglas L. Kriner, After the
Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 139. In comparative
perspective, Baum and Potter emphasize the importance of a robust opposition to publicizing foreign policy actions the
executive would rather keep quiet. Matthew A. Baum and Philip B. K. Potter, War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public
Influences Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 21–28.
12

H.J.Res. 87, 117th Congress (2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-jointresolution/87/cosponsors. The Biden administration, consistent with both the Trump and Obama administrations,
maintains that U.S. support to the Gulf coalition does not amount to “hostilities” as defined in WPR, and thus that the
bill is moot. White House, “Letter to the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate regarding the
War Powers Report,” June 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/06/08/letter-to-the-speaker-of-the-house-and-president-pro-tempore-of-the-senate-regarding-the-warpowers-report-3/.
13
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sympathetic to Congress’s position on an issue, or when it has yet to form an opinion on it, this
influence often takes place quietly, as members carry on back-channel conversations with executive
branch officials out of the public eye.14 When, on the other hand, Congress is at odds with the
president, members engage in public posturing, pressing their views in the media.15 Member’s
positions shape the tenor of that coverage, and the domestic political drama of congressional
challenges to the president may drive editors to give more, and more prominent, coverage of
international issues that they may have previously neglected.16
The case of Yemen suggests a specific way in which this public posturing functions.
Advocates worked assiduously to reframe the conflict, so that members and the public came to
understand the war as one of Saudi aggression — one that was aided and abetted by the United
States. Once that framing took hold, it became difficult for members to defend U.S. policy. And
then advocates exploited special procedures that inhere to arms export control and war powers
measures to force floor votes. Members who had little interest in the issue could no longer shrink
from it: they had to take a position on the record, one that they could defend to their constituents.
In this way, advocates cultivated majorities in opposition to the war by 2018–19. Even when these
majorities could not bind the executive branch, the White House nonetheless sought to mollify
Congress rather than court further political costs. So too, it seems, did Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
which depend on Congress’s goodwill to satisfy a variety of core national interests, many of which
have little to do with their objectives in Yemen. The turnabout in Congress is remarkable. Not only

14

Hersman, Friends and Foes, 7.

15

Howell and Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather, 29–32; Kriner, After the Rubicon, 61–69.

On the media “indexing” their stories to fit the contours of official opinion, see John Zaller and Dennis Chiu,
“Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945–1991,” Political Communication 13, no. 4
(October 1996): 385–405.
16
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was the war a niche issue at its outset, but most members who did take a stand supported it.17 Within
four years, majorities in both chambers cast votes effectively condemning it.
The next chapter tracks the arc of congressional advocacy as it developed in tandem with the
war itself. The following one delves into advocates’ successful reframing of the conflict and canny
use of legislative procedures to achieve political advantage. The conclusion then asks whether
lessons from this advocacy campaign might be fruitfully applied to other contemporary cases of U.S.
war-making.

Congressional Research Service, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015–2021, updated February 10,
2022, 6, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R45046.pdf; and International Crisis Group, Ending the Yemen Quagmire: Lessons
for Washington from Four Years of War, April 15, 2019, 8, https://www.crisisgroup.org/united-states/003-ending-yemenquagmire-lessons-washington-four-years-war.
17
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II. The Yemen War and Congressional Resistance
The Houthi takeover over Sanaa unfolded over late 2014 and early 2015, creating a situation
that was intolerable for Saudi Arabia’s newly crowned king, Salman, and his son, Minster of Defense
Mohammed bin Salman. Yemen’s transitional president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, had resigned
his office and been kept under house arrest in the capital. Only after fleeing the city did he reassert
his authority, however unpersuasively, from Aden, a port city that was itself threatened by the
insurgents. The takeover meant that Yemen, which Saudi Arabia had long treated as a subservient
country in its sphere of influence, was in the hands of a hostile insurgent group that would
potentially give its archrival, Iran, a beachhead on its southern border. Saudi Arabia assembled a
military coalition to restore Hadi and presented the United States with an ultimatum: either back the
coalition or be sidelined.1

The Obama Administration’s Entry into War
The Obama administration was caught flat-footed by the turn of events. Its primary interest
in Yemen since al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole in 2000 was counterterrorism, and it did not
appreciate the ways in which U.S. policy had helped create the conditions in which the Houthi coup
could succeed. Its hyperfocus on counterterrorism left it ambivalent about aspects of Yemen’s post–
Arab Spring transition to democracy. Popular protests, part of the wave of uprisings across the
Middle East and North Africa in 2011, had instigated the transition, but the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), comprising the region’s monarchies and headquartered in Riyadh, steered it,
brokering a compromise among elites that promised President Ali Abdullah Saleh and others

Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State (London: Saqi, 2022), ch. 1; and
Crisis Group, Ending the Yemen Quagmire.
1

8

immunity from prosecution. The GCC accord made security sector reform a priority (no other Arab
Spring country had adopted such a plan), but incumbents of the old regime stymied its
implementation. After the 9/11 attacks, Saleh aligned with the United States, and U.S. forces began
to train and equip elite Yemeni military units, essentially making them subcontractors in the “war on
terror.” During the transition, the United States took the lead among international donors on the
envisioned security sector reform, and it appears to have been content leaving in place Yemeni
officers with whom the U.S. military had long worked. Many of those Yemeni officers remained
loyal to Saleh after his ouster in 2011. Starting in 2014, they collaborated with the Houthis, joined by
mutual opposition to the transitional government.2
A dismal economy, meanwhile, left the broader population with little loyalty to the
transitional government. Deteriorating post-transition economic circumstances were exacerbated by
international policies. Donors had pledged $7.9 billion to support the transition in September 2012
but delivered only a fraction of it, and only after a delay of some 18 months — the time it took the
Yemeni government to set up a body to disburse the funds that would allay donors’ concerns about
corruption and state incapacity.3 To meet the International Monetary Fund’s demands for reform,
moreover, the government cut oil subsidies in July 2014. The move heightened economic hardship,
which the Houthis exploited, organizing mass antigovernment protests.4

Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, ch. 1; and Yezid Sayigh, Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen, Carnegie
Endowment for Peace, June 2015, 15–23, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Paper_YezidSayigh_crumbling_states.pdf.
2

Unlike some other donors, the United States did disburse 100 percent of its pledged amount. Lackner, Yemen in Crisis,
ch. 1, 9; and Susan L. Woodward, The Ideology of Failed States: Why Intervention Fails (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2017), 244–249.
3

Mohammed Ghobari, “Tens of Thousands of Yemeni Houthis Protest Against Govt in Capital,” Reuters, August 22,
2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-protests/tens-of-thousands-of-yemeni-houthis-protest-against-govtin-capital-idUSKBN0GM12C20140822; and “Yemen Fuel Subsidy Cuts Hit Poor Hardest,” IRIN, August 25, 2014,
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2014/08/25/yemen-fuel-subsidy-cuts-hit-poor-hardest.
4
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When Saudi Arabia presented the United States with its ultimatum, the Obama
administration had various reasons for assenting. One was its attachment to Hadi, who was the face
of the transitional government. The GCC compromise had elevated Hadi, Saleh’s longtime vice
president, to the presidency. The United States saw him as not only the legitimate ruler but also a
useful one: he allowed the United States to conduct drone strikes on al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, thought to be the terrorist group’s most dangerous franchise.5
In many ways, however, U.S. interests regarding Yemen were secondary to regional
considerations. Saudi Arabia had come to doubt U.S. commitments to its security because of the
lukewarm U.S. reception of the Arab Spring, which toppled regional dictators, and, more recently,
the nuclear negotiations with Iran, which were nearing their culmination with the signing of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. The agreement would release the monarchies’
regional archrival from some economic sanctions in exchange for limits on its nuclear development.
U.S. officials did not want to further alienate the kingdom.6
The White House also believed that the Saudi intervention was inevitable, and that U.S.
participation could at least make it more humane. The Saudi military had performed poorly in a
previous war against the Houthis, in 2009. Its air force was inexperienced and lacked tactical
controllers. U.S. support, American officials believed, could potentially professionalize it and
mitigate civilian harm.7 UN Security Council Resolution 2201, passed in February 2015, gave
international legal cover to the intervention by demanding that the Houthis withdraw from

On the various rationales the administration gave, see Zenko, “Make No Mistake”; and Crisis Group, Ending the Yemen
Quagmire, 6. For an administration perspective, see Robert Malley and Stephen Pomper, “How America Enables War in
Yemen,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 2 (April 2021): 73–89.
5

6

Crisis Group, Ending the Yemen Quagmire, 6–7.

See, e.g., Malley and Pomper, “How America Enables War in Yemen.” On Saudi military capabilities, see International
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016, 314–316.
7
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governmental institutions and free Hadi and members of his cabinet from detention. 8 And the
campaign, the Saudis assured Washington, would be over in a matter of weeks; they originally named
it Decisive Storm.9
Obama administration officials expressed reservations about the wisdom of the war and
Saudi military capabilities.10 “We knew we might be getting into a car with a drunk driver,” one
official reportedly said.11 Even so, the administration lent its backing. It shared intelligence with the
Saudi air force, establishing a joint planning cell for U.S. military attachés to coordinate with their
Gulf counterparts. It provided midair refueling for coalition war jets. And it facilitated the sale of
massive amounts of U.S.-manufactured equipment and munitions, as well as the training and
servicing the coalition militaries would need to use them. It is doubtful that the Saudi air force could
have sustained the war for long without the United States’ support. “If either Washington or
London halts the flow of logistics, the [Royal Saudi Air Force] will be grounded,” former intelligence
analyst Bruce Riedel later wrote.12 Between the two, the United States was far and away Saudi
Arabia’s predominant supplier.13
Members of Congress, to the extent they weighed in at the outset, were generally supportive
of Saudi Arabia. As the JCPOA negotiations neared completion, Republican and Democratic

8

UN Security Council Resolution 2201 (February 15, 2015), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2201.

9

Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, ch. 1.

Lackner, Yemen in Crisis; and Nicholas Niarchos, “How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse,” New Yorker,
January 15, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/22/how-the-us-is-making-the-war-in-yemen-worse.
10

11

Crisis Group, Ending the Yemen Quagmire, 5.

Bruce Riedel, “After Khashoggi, U.S. Arms Sales to the Saudis Are Essential Leverage,” Brookings, October 10, 2018,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/10/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-to-the-saudis-areessential-leverage/.
12

During the period 2016–20, the United States accounted for 79 percent of Saudi arms imports, and the United
Kingdom 9 percent. Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexandra Kuimova, and Siemon T. Wezeman, Trends in International Arms
Transfers, 2020, Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, March 2021,
https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/fs_2103_at_2020_v2.pdf.
13
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members alike took a hardline stance against Iran, threatening to derail the multilateral accord. In a
bill introduced just two weeks prior to the start of the intervention, overwhelming, bipartisan
majorities — 98 senators and 400 representatives — voted to curtail the president’s powers to enter
into international agreements by subjecting any final accord to a 60-day congressional review period.
During this time, the administration would be prohibited from delivering sanctions relief — that is,
the key U.S. commitment under the nuclear negotiations. The review period would effectively
provide Congress with an opportunity to veto the JCPOA.14 Members’ objections to the agreement
included the agreement’s failure to rein in Iran’s regional adventurism. They saw Yemen through this
lens, judging the Houthis to be Iranian proxies. If they were inclined to say anything about the war,
it was most likely to urge the Obama administration to offer the Gulf coalition even stronger
backing.15
But reports of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure from errant air
strikes — or perhaps even deliberate ones — arrived quickly. In August 2015, coalition war planes
destroyed the cranes that offloaded goods at the port of Hodeidah, an act that augured famine:
Yemen relied on imports for up to 90 percent of its food and fuel, and nearly 80 percent of imports
and humanitarian aid came through Hodeidah.16 The following month, an air strike on a wedding
party killed 131.17

14

Pub. L. No. 114–17 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1191.

15

CRS, Congress and the War in Yemen, 6; and Crisis Group, Ending the Yemen Quagmire, 8.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Ensuring Yemen’s Lifeline: The Criticality of All Yemeni
Ports,” November 13, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/ensuring-yemen-s-lifeline-criticality-all-yemeni-ports-13nov-2017-enar.
16

Mohammed Ghobari, “Death Toll from Air Strike on Wedding Party Rises Above 130: Medics,” Reuters, September
29, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/death-toll-from-air-strike-on-yemen-wedding-party-risesabove-130-medics-idUSKCN0RT0XT20150929.
17
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Members of congress began to express concerns. In October 2015, 13 Democratic
representatives wrote to Obama urging the administration to “work with our Saudi partners to limit
civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible.”18 Such letters are routine, if mild, forms of
congressional oversight; they are ways for members to both gather information and announce their
positions. At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing with the U.S. ambassador to Yemen
that month, the chair, Republican Bob Corker, and ranking member, Democrat Ben Cardin, both
offered strong reassurances to the Gulf coalition and expressed dismay that the Obama
administration had not offered it stronger support, yet even they felt compelled to acknowledge “an
intolerable level of civilian casualties.” Senator Edward Markey went further, pointedly asking
whether Saudi conduct might constitute such “gross violations of human rights” that they would
trigger the Leahy Law — that is, compel a cutoff of U.S. military assistance.19
Also in October 2015, Corker and Cardin put a hold on planned sales of precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia worth $1.3 billion,20 exercising a procedural privilege afforded
the committees’ leaders. The sale would replenish stocks depleted by the bombing campaign. The
following month, the pair took a novel step: requiring the administration to provide 30 days’ notice
prior to the shipment’s delivery, which would give Congress a second opportunity to block the
transfer. The sale ultimately went through. Nevertheless, the move was a novel step; Congress had
not previously attempted this maneuver, which was made possible by a 2013 amendment to the

Rep. Debbie Dingell et al. to President Barack Obama, October 14, 2015,
https://debbiedingell.house.gov/sites/debbiedingell.house.gov/files/documents/151014_yemen%20airstrike%20letter.
pdf.
18

The U.S. Role and Strategy in the Middle East: Yemen and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 114th Congress (October 6, 2015).
19

Julian Pecquet, “Senate Democrats Hold Up Arms Sales for Saudi War in Yemen,” Al-Monitor, October 7, 2015,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/10/saudi-war-yemen-senate-arms-sale.html#ixzz7dHLa64pN.
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Arms Export Control Act. It signaled that committee leaders would begin applying greater scrutiny
to arms deals that in the past they likely would have rubberstamped.21
News of civilian casualties piled up in the months that followed. Particularly egregious ones
made headlines: coalition war jets struck Doctors Without Borders hospitals and other health
infrastructure.22 In March 2016, they struck a northern market, killing at least 97 civilians.23 Amid
reports that Saudi Arabia had dropped cluster bombs — deadly and indiscriminate — on Sanaa and
increasing agitation in Congress, the Obama administration put a hold on future transfers of such
weapons to Saudi Arabia. It was the White House’s first tangible signal of discontent with the
coalition; until then, it had only issued statements of concern with civilian casualties.24 The House
subsequently tried to codify a prohibition on the transfer of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia; the
measure nearly succeeded on a 204–216 vote.25
In August 2016, Saudi Arabia escalated its air strikes, and civilian casualties mounted. A
strike on a school killed 10 children. Another, on a Doctors Without Borders hospital, killed 11. An
uneasy Obama administration began withdrawing U.S. personnel from the joint planning cell, whose
ostensible purpose was to help professionalize the Saudi air force and help it mitigate civilian

21

CRS, Congress and the War in Yemen, 4; and interview with Scott Paul, Oxfam America.

Mwatana for Human Rights and Physicians for Human Rights, “I Ripped the IV Out of My Arm and Started Running”:
Attacks on Health Care in Yemen, March 18, 2020, https://phr.org/our-work/resources/i-ripped-the-iv-out-of-my-armand-started-running-attacks-on-health-care-in-yemen/.
22

Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: US Bombs Used in Deadliest Market Strike,” April 7, 2016,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/08/yemen-us-bombs-used-deadliest-market-strike.
23

Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Coalition Drops Cluster Bombs in Capital,” January 7, 2016,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/07/yemen-coalition-drops-cluster-bombs-capital; and John Hudson, “Exclusive:
White House Blocks Transfer of Cluster Bombs to Saudi Arabia,” Foreign Policy, May 27, 2016,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/exclusive-white-house-blocks-transfer-of-cluster-bombs-to-saudi-arabia/.
24

25

H.R. 5293 (2016), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2016327.

14

casualties.26 UN human rights commissioner Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein reinforced the finding that the
coalition had possibly committed war crimes.27
That same month, members sought to block an arms sale to Saudi Arabia worth $1.15 billion
primarily involving tanks. Sixty-four members of Congress wrote to the White House not only
opposing the deal but intimating that the White House notified them of it during the August recess
to evade congressional scrutiny.28 The bill to block the sale ultimately garnered only 27 votes in the
Senate.29 But it was extraordinary that the bill had been put forward at all. This first legislative
attempt to block an arms sale picked a hard target: the tanks were presumptively for Saudi Arabia to
defend itself from cross-border attacks, and they would not have advanced the air war, the source of
most civilian casualties. Even so, the measure demonstrated one way forward for advocates. It was
also a marker that a seismic turn against Saudi Arabia was underway.30
It took a particularly grisly air strike for the Obama administration to further walk back its
support for the coalition. After the coalition bombed a Sanaa funeral in October 2016, killing 140
attendees, the administration finally said it had not issued a “blank check,” and it ordered a policy
review. “The ‘policy review,’ ” two administration veterans wrote at the time, “is an old and
established Washington technique for avoiding tough decisions. . . . The hope is that by the time the
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review is finished, the political pressure to take action will have passed.”31 Only in December, as a
lame duck, did the administration pause a planned PGM sale; still, it maintained in-flight refueling
and other forms of support.32 Ultimately, then, the review did little to constrain the U.S. role in the
war before the Obama handed it off to Trump.

Escalation Under the Trump Administration
If Obama was a reluctant participant in the war, Trump entered office an enthusiastic one.
The new president pledged close relations with Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Salman, the war’s
architect. He had campaigned on a platform hostile to Iran and staffed his administration with likeminded national security officials, who wanted to withdraw from the JCPOA and believed that its
relaxation of economic sanctions enabled Iranian regional aggression, including in Yemen. And
Trump reveled in brokering arms deals on behalf of U.S. defense firms. The administration
neglected the UN-mediated peace process and provided the Gulf coalition with targeting support.33
In May 2017, the administration notified Congress that it would move forward with the PGM sale
Obama had put on hold. A week later, Trump made Riyadh the first stop of his first trip overseas as
president and boasted of signing arms deals with the kingdom worth $110 billion.34
The coalition had been preparing to escalate the war with a campaign to wrest the port city
of Hodeidah from insurgent control. The battle itself promised to be catastrophic, and its
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ramifications even more so: port operations had already been slowed by Saudi Arabia’s destruction
of cranes (and refusal to facilitate replacements) and fighting at the port had the potential to cut off
food and fuel to the country’s north.35 Against this backdrop, members of Congress challenged the
PGM sale. A joint resolution of disapproval, sponsored by Senators Rand Paul, Chris Murphy, and
Al Franken, narrowly failed to advance on a 47–53 floor vote.36 In just nine months since the
previous vote on an arms sale, 20 more senators had joined on.
Congress also made its first attempt to leverage the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR)
to compel the administration to end its support for the Saudi-led military campaign. Representative
Ro Khanna introduced the bill in the House in September 2017, joined by Progressive Caucus chair
Mark Pocan and Republicans Thomas Massie and Walter Jones in asserting that U.S. assistance to
the coalition amounted to unauthorized and unconstitutional participation by U.S. armed forces in
hostilities.37 However, House leadership — reportedly, the Democratic whip among them — balked
at the measure and engineered a tepid alternative: a nonbinding statement of the “sense of the
House of Representatives” that included a reminder that Congress had not authorized the use of
military force.38 This compromise passed the House in November by a 366–30 vote.39 The vote
came just after Saudi Arabia had tightened its blockade of ports in Houthi-controlled territory in
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retaliation for Houthi cross-border attacks, spurring ever-more dire warnings of famine. In a phone
call with King Salman, Trump insisted that humanitarian aid be let in.40 Within weeks, Saudi Arabia
not only loosened the blockade but permitted they delivery of U.S.-financed replacement cranes to
Hodeidah, which it had obstructed for the past year.41 The events showed that when the
administration applied pressure to the coalition, it could be effective. But it would not do so
consistently without outside pressure.
Amid this swelling opposition in Congress, 2018 proved to be a watershed year. Advocates
built on previous years’ initiatives, crafting new ones with more teeth and getting majorities to sign
on to them. By the end of the year, it was clear that the issue animated many more members than
just the progressive wing of the Democratic caucus and libertarian-minded Republicans.
At the end of February 2018, Senators Bernie Sanders, Mike Lee, and Chris Murphy
introduced a war powers resolution similar to the one Khanna had put forward the year prior.42 The
administration aggressively fought it. Officials held closed-door briefings on the Hill.43 Secretary of
Defense James Mattis warned members that its passage could exacerbate humanitarian harm, and
the Pentagon produced a legal analysis refuting the claim that U.S. armed forces were, in fact,
involved in hostilities — in other words, that the WPR applied.44 But the same day that Trump
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greeted Mohammed bin Salman at the White House — touting their warm relationship and arms
deals — senators brought the resolution to the floor. It was tabled by a vote of 55–44 after intense
lobbying by Saudi representatives and a lunchtime appearance on the Hill that very day by Mattis.45
The effect was to put the resolution on hold. But the vote also showed how far support for the
WPR had come.
Meanwhile, even senators who had been stalwart supporters of U.S.–Gulf ties — and who
had voted to shelve the WPR — grew agitated. Bob Menendez, an Iran hawk, had assumed the top
Democratic position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On June 12, 2018, the day that the
coalition began its long-planned attack on Hodeidah, he and Corker led colleagues in a bipartisan
letter warning that the coalition’s planned offensive augured “unacceptable consequences for any
responsible member of the community of nations.” They urged the administration to support the
UN special envoy’s diplomacy.46 Menendez went on to hold up subsequent arms sales to the
kingdom.47
Senators Todd Young and Jeanne Shaheen pursued a separate track to restrict U.S. support
for the coalition. They introduced a bill to make continued U.S. refueling of coalition jets contingent
on the secretary of state certifying that the Saudi and Emirati governments were pursuing diplomacy
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to end the war, facilitating humanitarian aid, and taking steps to minimize civilian casualties. An
amendment ultimately diluted their measure with a carveout: by citing “national security interests,”
the administration could waive the certification requirements. But to do so, the secretary would still
need to explain his position publicly. That amendment in place, the measure was incorporated into
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2019.48 As a part of this “must-pass
legislation,” it was guaranteed to be made into law. In mid-August, Trump signed the bill. In a
signing statement, he took issue with the measure’s requirements as a trespass on his constitutional
prerogatives.49 Nevertheless, his administration complied.
Secretary of State Pompeo issued the first of the certifications mandated by the YoungShaheen measure in mid-September 2018, amid a worsening situation in Yemen that made his
attestations seem implausible. Emirati ground forces were leading the campaign to take Hodeidah,
spurring a surge in casualties.50 The UN’s warnings of likely famine became increasingly dire.51 In
August, a coalition air strike struck a school bus, killing 51, including 40 children. 52
U.S. officials had long testified that they did not track whether strikes resulting in civilian
casualties had used U.S.-supplied munitions. CNN, however, tied the school bus trike to U.S. arms
based on shrapnel recovered at the scene: the bomb dropped on the school bus was identified as
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having been manufactured by Lockheed Martin and sold in a deal blessed by the U.S. government.53
In subsequent coverage, the network, drawing on field work conducted by the Yemeni human rights
group Mwatana, similarly tied civilian casualties from air strikes going back to 2015 to munitions
made by various U.S. arms makers and all sold in deals signed off on by the State Department.54
In issuing the certification, Pompeo reportedly overruled regional specialists at the State
Department who warned that such a determination would “provide no incentive for Saudi
leadership to take our diplomatic messaging seriously” and “damage the Department’s credibility
with Congress.” Pompeo sided instead with officials who said that a failure to certify would
jeopardize pending arms sales.55 Senators called the certification implausible.56 Members who had
not previously been vocal on Yemen were incensed.57
Shortly after Pompeo’s certification, Representative Ro Khanna introduced a companion bill
to the Senate’s war powers resolution. It garnered 101 co-sponsors.58 The Senate, meanwhile,
resumed debate over the bill, which had been on hold since the spring. Deteriorating circumstances
in Yemen and outrage over Pompeo’s certification meant that momentum for the measure was
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already building when Saudi Arabia assassinated the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, provoking outrage
even among the kingdom’s previously staunch supporters in Congress.59
The Trump administration found its strong support for the Gulf coalition no longer tenable.
Previously, Washington had “signal[ed] its acquiescence” to the Hodeidah campaign;60 now, Pompeo
and Mattis publicly threw their support behind the UN-led peace process mediated by Special Envoy
Martin Griffiths, and Mattis reportedly made private overtures to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to secure
their buy-in for a cease-fire.61 At Mattis’s urging, Saudi Arabia announced that it would no longer
rely on U.S. aerial refueling for its war jets. The move seemed designed not only to render the WPR
bill moot but also to get out of the NDAA’s certification requirements — a source of unwanted,
embarrassing publicity.62 These measures did not mollify Congress, however: the Senate passed the
WPR on December 13 by a 56–41 vote. The WPR likely would have passed the House as well had
not Paul Ryan, in the final days of his speakership, maneuvered to block the chamber from taking up
the companion bill.63
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As the Senate voted, Griffiths announced that negotiators in Stockholm representing Hadi’s
government in exile and the Houthis had agreed to a cease-fire. Under its terms, the UAE
committed to pull back the anti-Houthi Yemeni forces it allied with from Hodeidah.64
The new year, 2019, ushered in a flurry of activity. With Democrats now in charge of the
House, a new WPR passed the chamber 248–177, and the Senate voted 54–46 for it in March 2019.
Trump vetoed it, and the Senate failed to override.65 In May, the Trump administration notified
lawmakers that it intended to proceed with an $8 billion sale of precision-guided missiles and other
arms. Congress attempted to block the sales by passing three joint resolutions of disapproval; these
bills were vetoed by Trump in July.66
Also in July 2019, the UAE announced its withdrawal from the coalition. The WPR vote,
combined with anticipation of a Democrat winning the White House in the 2020 elections, led the
monarchy to judge that the diplomatic costs of tethering itself to Saudi Arabia had exceeded any
strategic benefit. (The UAE would, however, continue to back armed separatist groups in the south.)
Saudi Arabia’s loss of its primary coalition partner was a blow to its war effort; the UAE had done
most of the ground fighting, as Saudi Arabia’s capabilities were mostly limited to prosecuting the
war via the air.67
Meanwhile, the new NDAA provided another venue for Congress to rein in the president
and, by extension, Saudi Arabia. The spending bill for FY 2020 codified a two-year prohibition on
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in-flight refueling for coalition aircraft.68 In a signing statement, Trump objected to the measure.69
Nevertheless, he effectively abided by it. When the next certification deadline mandated by the FY
2019 NDAA came up, the administration declined to issue it, not wanting a reprise of the blowback
Pompeo had earlier encountered. The administration claimed that, since the United States was no
longer refueling Saudi jets, the provision was moot.70
By the end of 2019, the politics of Yemen had been transformed. A chastened Trump
administration had been forced to dial back its support for the Saudi-led coalition and press it to
pursue a negotiated settlement. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, lost its most militarily capable member.
Meanwhile, the Democratic presidential primaries would soon enter full swing. Candidates could no
longer treat the war in Yemen as a marginal issue, as they might have in 2016; rather, they uniformly
condemned that Saudi-led war there and pledged an end to U.S. support for it — a far cry from the
muted response that accompanied Obama’s entry into the war five years prior.71
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III. Congressional Advocacy Strategies
On the basis of roll-call votes won or bills enacted into law, members of Congress who
championed antiwar measures and their civil society partners arguably have meager results to show
for their dogged efforts. It took them several years to cultivate majorities for the bills that would
have been most consequential: those that would have blocked arms sales or compelled an end to
U.S. participation in the war. Predictably, those bills were vetoed, and the supermajority
requirements for an override proved insurmountable. Even when advocates did get measures signed
into law, as they did with reporting and certification requirements in successive NDAAs, Trump
asserted in signing statements that he did not consider himself bound by them. They were, in his
view, trespasses on the president’s constitutional prerogatives as commander in chief. It is likely that
any of his predecessors would have asserted a similar position.1
All of this speaks to the exceptionally high barriers to pursuing an antiwar campaign through
Congress. Activists may find that the legislature is the political institution most accessible to them,
but there they face multiple veto points, all difficult to overcome. Pursuing antiwar aims through
Congress can look like a fool’s errand.
By other measures, though, advocates can claim notable successes. Even if they failed to
achieve the overarching goal of legally compelling the United States to withdraw its support for the
coalition — support on which Saudi Arabia relied — they can persuasively claim credit for
mitigating civilian harm and reducing U.S. complicity in the conflict.
These successes can be seen most clearly during Trump’s presidency. The administration’s
foreign policy aligned closely with the Gulf countries’ priorities, and so moments in which it pressed
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Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners for restraint can reasonably be attributed to domestic pressure
rather than strategic considerations. The administration’s most significant moves to rein in the
coalition and advance a negotiated settlement coincided with the zenith of congressional activity. By
October 2018, Secretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Pompeo were urging the coalition
to pursue a UN-brokered cease-fire rather than pursue the assault on Hodeidah, a turnabout from
the more permissive stance the administration had previously signaled.2 The resulting cease-fire,
known as the Stockholm Agreement, was signed the very day that the Senate passed the war powers
resolution.3
Advocates’ influence is reflected as well in the actions of coalition members. In August 2018,
as congressional opprobrium following the school bus strike was mounting, the coalition’s
investigative body announced it would begin issuing condolence payments to families of civilian
victims, a necessary, if hardly sufficient, gesture of accountability for harm.4 By November 2018,
Mattis announced that the Saudi air force would forgo U.S. aerial refueling — the subject of the
WPR then wending its way through Congress, as well as the NDAA-mandated certification that had
generated so much blowback for Pompeo weeks earlier.5 The UAE’s withdrawal from the coalition
the following year likewise reflected a reevaluation of the costs of being yoked to Saudi Arabia.6
More generally, analysts attribute the reduction in coalition air strikes that caused mass civilian
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casualties to growing pressure from the United States.7 The Yemen Data Project’s air strike database
bears out the contention that air strikes became significantly less deadly for civilians over time.8
Much of this momentum toward mitigating civilian harm and reducing U.S. complicity could
plausibly be attributed not to congressional pressure per se, but rather to the broader climate of
public and elite opinion in the United States turning against the war and the Gulf coalition as reports
of atrocities mounted, thus raising the political costs of continued involvement. Certainly,
congressional activity does not wholly explain the administration’s or the coalition’s changes of
policy or behavior. But these explanations are not mutually exclusive. In many ways, Congress is a
driver of public and elite opinion, which in turn bears on executive decision-making.9
By taking a conflict largely seen in the United States as a regional proxy war and reframing it
as a war of Saudi aggression, advocates delegitimized the war and the U.S. role in it. And by forcing
floor votes, advocates generated domestic political drama that elevated Yemen in the headlines, and
they made members who might otherwise have gladly shied from the issue to take a public stand on
it. Taken together, this created pressure that the administration and its foreign partners were hardpressed to ignore.

Reframing the Conflict
Before advocates could achieve policy changes, they first had to change how members of
Congress and their staffs, as well as the broader public, understood the conflict in Yemen and the
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United States’ role in it. This required not just disseminating the facts about a conflict that got
relatively little media coverage at the outset but also interpreting those so that advocates’ view of the
moral stakes became predominant.10
Historian Laurent Bonnefoy notes that policymakers in the United States and Europe have
often talked about Yemen’s strategic importance and yet seldom engaged with the country’s internal
politics, instead viewing it through “a set of selective obsessions” — namely, after the 2000 USS Cole
bombing and the 9/11 attacks that soon followed, counterterrorism. In all the years after, countering
al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula was the animating concern of their policies. When civil war broke
out, they were at a loss to understand it. As a result, three narratives — all tending to reduce
Yemenis to “pawns of wider dynamics” — took hold.11 Contestation over what the proper U.S. role
should be vis-à-vis conflict in Yemen has been, at root, contestation over how that conflict should
be understood.
From early 2015, the Obama administration averred what Bonnefoy calls the “institutional
narrative.” This legalistic view highlights the illegitimacy of the Houthis’ overthrow of Yemen’s
recognized government under international law and the legitimacy of the Hadi government’s
invitation of the Gulf coalition’s intervention under the doctrine of self-defense. UN Security
Council Resolution 2216, passed shortly after the start of the intervention, reinforced this view in
international law.12
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The institutional narrative complements a second one: that Yemen is a battlefield on which
Iran and Saudi Arabia compete for regional hegemony. This view is premised in part on the claim
that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy.13 Saudi Arabia saw the Houthis as an incipient Hezbollah on
its southern border, augmenting its fears of encirclement by Iran and its proxies. The JCPOA would
only aggravate the situation by freeing Iran of a bevy of international sanctions.14
If the institutional narrative suggested that the Gulf intervention in Yemen was legitimate,
this geopolitical narrative suggested that it was strategic — a necessary salvo against an aggressive
Iran. It also bolstered arguments for the coalition-enforced blockade, whose rationale was
enforcement of the UN-ratified arms embargo. Saudi diplomats touted this narrative, and many
members of Congress echoed it.15 “[We need to] have the Saudis’ back . . . because that may give the
Saudis some comfort that, even if we do reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, that
doesn’t mean that we’re not going to be willing to confront Iran as it tries to expand its quite
nefarious influence,” Representative Adam Schiff said at the start of the intervention.16 If there was a
prevailing view in Congress at the start of the intervention, it was that the Obama administration
was not backing the Saudi coalition forcefully enough.17
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In the following months and years, civil society worked to educate members of Congress
and their staff, along with the media, about the conflict’s indigenous origins and the domestic
consequences of the Gulf intervention.18 This eroded the predominance of the geopolitical narrative.
A third narrative soon supplanted it as the way in which both the public and members of Congress
increasingly understood the war in Yemen. In this formulation, the war in Yemen is principally a war
of Saudi aggression. A regional powerhouse was bombing and blockading its impoverished neighbor
into submission, aided and abetted by its partners in the United States and Europe.19 This narrative
counseled that Washington ought to cut off support for Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners.20
Without the United States to resupply its munitions stocks and maintain its jets, the kingdom could
not sustain the war effort.21
Corroborating this narrative, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, for
example, found that two-thirds of the conflict’s direct civilian casualties could be attributed to
coalition air strikes.22 Similarly, much of the conflict’s indirect casualties are attributable to the
coalition. The Saudi-enforced blockade, along with economic policies imposed by Hadi’s
government in exile to coerce Houthi-controlled parts of the country, has been a leading driver of
hunger and disease.23
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High-profile atrocities have reinforced this narrative in the American public’s eye. The war
has not been a routine fixture in U.S. news, but air strikes that incurred startling civilian death tolls
— the market, funeral hall, and school bus bombings among them — all made headlines. Reports
such as the aforementioned CNN/Mwatana analysis of shrapnel found at bomb sites reinforced the
sense that the United States had aided and abetted these atrocities.24 Similarly, more recent reporting
published by the Washington Post in collaboration with the NGO Security Force Monitor ties specific
coalition fighter jet squadrons developed and sold by U.S. companies, and supported by U.S.
maintenance and training contracts, to air strikes hitting civilians or civilian infrastructure.25
Findings likes these, made by the media and civil society, have been all the more remarkable
because they refuted long-standing U.S. government claims. On the one hand, the Obama and
Trump administrations alike asserted that U.S. support would improve the coalition’s targeting, and
thus protect civilians.26 (This despite UN and civil society charges that the coalition failed to take
appropriate measures to mitigate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.)27 On the other hand,
the State and Defense Departments had testified that they did not — or could not — track the end
use of matériel whose transfer they had approved. In other words, if U.S.-supplied munitions, jets,
or fuel was used in the commission of specific bombings, including ones that might have violated
international humanitarian law, the United States could not know it.28 Reports such as CNN’s and
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the Post’s made for a powerful rebuttal, highlighting specific instances in which the United States was
implicated in likely war crimes.
Public opinion reflected outrage with the sense of U.S. complicity. An International Rescue
Committee poll commissioned after the school bus bombing found that Americans who were aware
of U.S. support for the coalition were overwhelmingly opposed to continued arms sales.29 The
following June, a Chicago Council survey found that 70 percent of Americans believe that arms sales
harm U.S. national security.30 Nor were these polls characterized by strong partisan polarization:
both showed a majority of Republican respondents joining in opposition to arms sales. Members of
Congress received phone calls from constituents, heard concerns at town halls, and were the target
of protests in their districts and in Washington. Members who had not previously been engaged on
the matter of Yemen — or foreign policy more generally — were given an impetus to back pending
legislation.31
By the 2020 presidential primaries, every candidate was compelled to run against U.S.
complicity in the war.32 Joe Biden, running as the moderate in the race — and an experienced
foreign policy hand — pledged to treat Saudi Arabia as the “pariah that they are” and end arms sales
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to the kingdom.33 The issue was salient enough that Biden felt compelled to address Yemen in his
very first foreign policy speech after taking office. Addressing State Department staff, he maintained
his commitment to “ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen,
including relevant arms sales.”34
Such reframing is controversial, however, and it does not track with the way many Yemenis
themselves understand the conflict.35 As Bonnefoy suggests, the focus on the “war on Yemen”
obscures the “war in Yemen,” which is to say the multisided civil war that has only gotten more
complex since the conflict’s internationalization. Singling out Saudi aggression can be interpreted as
giving cover to the Houthis, who precipitated the crisis and are responsible for no shortage of
civilian harm.36 Analyst Iyad al-Baghdadi writes: “When it comes to the war of narratives, and
despite all of their public relations and lobbying, the Saudis and Emiratis have lost the war of public
perception. And this is despite the Houthis’ war crimes, extremism, rampant human rights abuses,
and direct links to the IRGC.”37
The understanding of the war as U.S.-backed Saudi aggression in fact echoes the Houthis’
own understanding of the conflict, however inadvertently.38 Some Yemeni analysts, moreover,
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express frustration with the American focus on Saudi aggression for emboldening the Houthis to
uncompromisingly pursue their aims on the battlefield.39 The frame may also distort policymaking by
falsely suggesting a two-sided conflict; any ostensible peace process that fails to take into account
Yemen’s fragmentation among myriad armed groups will be doomed.40
Moreover, this frame is proving remarkably sticky, and some advocates argue that it has
outlived its utility. A UN-brokered cease-fire begun in April 2022 has been renewed twice and, as of
this writing, remains in force. Meanwhile, a new war powers resolution to end U.S. support for the
Saudi war effort is now wending its way through Congress, with 112 co-sponsors in the House.41 Its
advocates say that the bill, which includes a prohibition on the provision of maintenance and spare
parts that Riyadh needs to keep its jets flying, will prod the parties to continue to pursue peace
talks.42 In the view of many analysts, however, it is the Houthis who are now the primary obstacle to
deepening the truce and proceeding to a negotiated settlement.43

Taking Advantage of Procedural Hooks
Advocates likewise took advantage of specific legislative hooks to advance their initiatives.
Attaching measures to funding bills provided one way to avoid legislative tactics that so often leave
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controversial bills to languish in committee. Making use of the procedural privileges afforded arms
control and war powers measures likewise ensured that initiatives on Yemen could not be derailed.
These maneuvers meant that members could not avoid taking a position on these bills, at a moment
when advocates’ reframing of the conflict made these bills harder to oppose. In this way, advocates
inside and outside Congress cultivated majorities. Even when the bills failed — or were vetoed
— the votes generated additional press coverage of the U.S. role in Yemen and signaled to the
administration and the Gulf coalition that maintaining their conduct of the war would be politically
costly.
The appropriations power, as political scientist Linda Fowler writes, is the “primary lever
Congress can use to assert its war powers.”44 The Pentagon and military depend on the National
Defense Authorization Act being passed every year to maintain their funding. It is thus considered
“must-pass legislation,” and members of Congress who can successfully amend it will therefore see
their pet issues signed into law.
Advocates of withdrawing U.S. support for the coalition, or otherwise constraining it, have
consistently targeted NDAAs, attaching increasingly stringent measures to them over the years. The
FY 2018 law (passed the prior calendar year) required public reporting from the administration on
Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners’ efforts to minimize civilian harm and improve their targeting
practices, among other matters.45 A stronger measure in the FY 2019 law made continued funding
for aerial refueling contingent on similar certifications: that the Gulf coalition was taking
demonstrable steps to advance diplomacy, provide humanitarian relief, and minimize harm to
civilians and civilian infrastructure. A compromise allowed the secretary of state to waive the
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certification requirement on the grounds that U.S. national security necessitated continued refueling
operations, but that too required the administration to defend its position with respect to Saudi and
Emirati conduct of the war and U.S. national interests.46
By forcing the administration to give such a public accounting, the measure contributed to
growing unease and outrage with the war. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued the initial
certification in September 2018, less than a month after the school bus bombing. His attestation that
Saudi and Emirati forces were “undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to
civilians and civilian infrastructure” was met with incredulity, likely bringing more lawmakers into
the antiwar camp.47 A bipartisan letter led by Senators Todd Young and Jeanne Shaheen stated “we
find it difficult to reconcile known facts with at least two of your certifications.”48 The
administration ended aerial refueling shortly thereafter, using it as a pretense to avoid future
certifications.49
Subsequent NDAAs ratcheted up pressure on the administration: The FY 2020 law,
amended after the school bus bombing, codified a two-year prohibition on aerial refueling.50 The FY
2022 law extends the prohibition another two years and also requires reporting to determine
whether aircraft and munitions used in air strikes resulting in civilian casualties had been provided by
the United States.51
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The other two major legislative vehicles advocates have used to rein in U.S. support for the
Gulf coalition are the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) and the War Powers Resolution of
1973 (WPR). The AECA gives Congress a formal role in reviewing arms sales52 — a power that in
other countries bypasses the legislature entirely.53 The WPR can be used to compel a withdrawal of
U.S. forces from “hostilities” absent congressional authorization.54
The historical record suggests neither has lived up to its promise: only once, in 1985, has
Congress blocked an arms sale through the AECA despite dozens of attempts since;55 no president
has ever recognized the constitutionality of the WPR; 56 and until Yemen, the House and Senate had
never jointly asserted their prerogatives under it to challenge presidential use of force.57 But the laws’
procedural idiosyncrasies, by inverting the usual role of the Senate, served to enhance the indirect
pressure that congressional action on related bills could generate.
The U.S. system is one of many veto points, and the Senate, by design and tradition, is a
particularly daunting one. It is, ordinarily, the chamber where popular initiatives passed by the
House languish, entangled by tactics like the filibuster or suppressed by the chamber’s leadership.
Moreover, members of Congress are typically risk averse when it comes to matters of war and peace;
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most would prefer to avoid taking any vote on military engagements with uncertain outcomes,
seeing little upside and potentially much electoral downside to going on record.58 The AECA and
WPR, however, provide that bills taken up under them are expedited and privileged. Debate is
limited, and there is no filibuster; the full Senate must take a vote on them.59 This, in turn, meant
that reluctant lawmakers had no choice but to publicly declare a position.60
The more that Yemen was understood as a war of Saudi aggression — one aided and abetted
by the United States — the harder it would be for lawmakers to vote to allow continued arms sales
or U.S. support for the coalition more broadly. As one campaigner sees it, “When we’ve done things
publicly, we tend to win on the Saudi war in Yemen. When things are happening in private, we tend
to lose, we tend to see a continuation of human rights violations, and we see no accountability.” 61 In
that way, advocates secured majorities for war powers and arms sales bills by 2019. The vetoes
notwithstanding, these majority votes sent powerful signals to the White House and the Gulf
coalition that they would incur escalating political costs by maintaining the status quo.

Indirect Influence and Its Limits
The bills that would have mattered most for restraining the Saudi-led coalition either fell
short of garnering majorities or passed both chambers of Congress only to be vetoed by the
president. And yet, if not for this activity, it is difficult to imagine that the Trump administration
would have urged the coalition to accept the Stockholm Agreement, that Saudi Arabia would have
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declined U.S. aerial refueling, or perhaps even that the UAE would have withdrawn from the
coalition if not for the pressure drummed up by congressional debate. All this is indicative of
Congress exerting influence indirectly.62
This influence runs along two tracks. Most clearly, it reverberates on the executive branch.
The White House is attuned to public and elite opinion. By reframing the conflict and forcing votes,
advocates in Congress turned opinion against the war, raising the political costs of untrammeled
support for the coalition. State Department and Pentagon officials, meanwhile, want to maintain
good relations with members of the committees that oversee them and appropriate their budgets,
giving these executive branch actors further reason to be responsive to Congress.63
Congressional influence also weighs on foreign capitals. Scholars have previously noted that
U.S. foreign policy debates have an international audience. Just as adversaries observe whether
Congress is supportive or skeptical of a president and, on that basis, assess the credibility of a
president’s threats,64 partners are likewise attentive to legislative opposition. The Gulf countries are
particularly keen observers of Washington politics, and they depend on Congress’s goodwill to
advance various security and economic priorities. As majorities had coalesced in Congress around
blocking arms sales and passing the WPR, it stood to reason that the Gulf countries would moderate
their conduct of the war (or, in the UAE’s case, largely withdraw from it) rather than risk still greater
legitimacy costs.65
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IV. Conclusion
The case of U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen suggests both the potential and
limits of working through Congress to restrain the use of force. Congress is unlikely to deter the
resort to arms in the first place. Obama, after all, had no reason to anticipate congressional
opposition, which was hardly inevitable and only crystallized after several years of dogged advocacy
in combination with mounting evidence of atrocities. Nor is Congress likely to compel an end to
participation in hostilities; the barriers to mustering veto-proof supermajorities are immense. But it
can influence the conduct of war by raising the political costs faced by both the administration and
its foreign partners.1 In a conflict marked from the outset by disregard for civilian lives and
livelihoods, that may be a modest achievement, but it is hardly negligible.
Advocates who worked assiduously to cobble together majorities to rein in U.S. support for
the Saudi-led coalition have not only left a template for future campaigns; they have also lowered the
hurdles that will be faced by their successors. The WPR’s provisions for Congress to compel a
withdrawal from hostilities had laid dormant ever since they were established nearly a half century
prior. Part of the Yemen campaign entailed simply educating members and their staff that they had
tools provided for by the WPR and the AECA at their disposal.2 As one legislative aide says: “We
had to get them out of the tool shed and dust them off.”3
This newly developed institutional knowledge is poised to shape congressional initiatives that
go well beyond Yemen. In early 2020, Congress wasted little time passing a second war powers
resolution, this time concerning Iran. The Trump administration had just assassinated the Iranian
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general Qassem Suleimani. As tensions reached a fever pitch, a bill mirroring the Yemen resolution’s
language passed the Senate approved it by a 55–45 vote and the House by a 227–186 vote. Trump
vetoed it. Arguably, however, it still served de-escalatory purposes at a particularly fraught moment,
signaling to both Trump and Iran that Congress had little appetite for war.4
An evaluation of this campaign’s strategies, successes, and shortcomings should be of
interest to other campaigners seeking transparency and accountability for U.S. military engagements.
The U.S. way of war no longer entails massive troop deployments, and with them, large numbers of
American casualties. (These are the circumstances that much of the scholarly literature on Congress
and war powers contemplates.) Instead, the United States is more likely to pursue its military goals
through drone strikes, as it has in Yemen against al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula, or local
forces, as it has by subcontracting ground fighting in the anti-ISIS campaign to the Kurdish
peshmerga in Iraq and People’s Defense Units in Syria.5
Wars waged this way are politically easy to sustain. By displacing risk onto others, whether
foreign civilians or forces, presidents render risk to American troops exceedingly low. These wars
are more easily hidden from the press’s view, not least because they are often waged in secret.
Moreover, the press may report on them, and yet they still may not register with the public; even in
far more visible wars, “the deaths of others” have routinely been met with public indifference.6
Members of Congress, who generally have few incentives to engage in robust oversight of the use of
force, may be even less inclined to do so when the executive branch offers a counterterrorism
rationale; that implicates the national interest more clearly than the war in Yemen does. And yet
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there are promising signs that some members are eager to champion these issues. In August 2022,
Representative Ro Khanna joined four other House members in inaugurating a new Protection of
Civilians in Conflict Caucus.7
As Mary Dudziak argues, “military engagement no longer seem[s] to require the support of
the American people, but instead their inattention”8 — the sort of inattention that might be
occasioned by a military intervention announced by nothing more than a routine White House press
release. The campaign to end U.S. support for the Gulf war in Yemen suggests ways that advocates
may overcome this very inattention, force contemporary wars onto the public agenda, and, in so
doing, attenuate their harm.
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